

DECEMBER 13, 1949
590th BROADCAST

Town Meeting

BULLETIN OF AMERICA'S TOWN MEETING OF THE AIR

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Our Policy Toward Western Germany Sound?

Moderator, **GEORGE V. DENNY, Jr.**

Speakers

JAMES K. POLLOCK

CHARLES M. LAFOLLETTE

WARD H. LITCHFIELD

TELFORD TAYLOR

(See also page 12)

COMING

December 20, 1949

**Does a \$100-a-Month Pension for All Retired
Persons Provide Real Security?**

December 27, 1949

Can Youth Have Faith in the Future?

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
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
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Town Meeting

BULLETIN OF AMERICA'S TOWN MEETING OF THE AIR

GEORGE V. DENNY, JR., MODERATOR



BER 13, 1949

VOL. 15, No. 33

Is Our Policy Toward Western Germany Sound?

Announcer:

Welcome, friends, to historic Town Hall in New York City for the 60th broadcast of America's Town Meeting of the Air. As turned on your radio tonight to listen to this program, millions of fellow Americans joined you, listening to one of the 267 programs of the American Broadcasting Company. They are meeting with you to consider one of our common problems—a problem we face together—a problem which has in it the seeds of another war.

For this week this program will be broadcast by short wave under the "Voice of America" to all parts of the world.

Japan, a group of alert young Japanese will record what we hear, translate it into the Japanese language, and send it to several dozen Japanese newspapers, as a syndicated feature. Mr. Denny and his associates met these young people last summer in Japan, and brought back some of these syndicated Town Meetings with them.

Through the miracle of your radio, your crier's bell—free-bell—rings each week across our land and around the

to preside over our discussion, here is your moderator, President of Town Hall, founder of America's Town Meeting, George V. Denny, Jr. Mr. Denny. (*Applause*)

Moderator Denny:

Good evening, neighbors, and thanks for your wonderful response to last week's program. We've tabulated the results of

your voting on the question of recognition of Communist China and I'll give you the results at the close of tonight's meeting.

Once again the editors of *Life* magazine and our program committee selected the same subject for discussion the same week. This week's editorial in *Life* on the "Rise of Western Germany" probes deep into tonight's question and reminds us of the utmost importance of our policy toward Western Germany.

That we chose the same subject at this time was mere coincidence, but it is not accidental that informed people everywhere are beginning to realize that we need a consistent foreign policy which must be applied in all of our foreign relations, and that this policy must be based on principle rather than political expediency.

Military expediency divided Germany into four parts at the close of World War II. The fear of World War III has resulted in the establishment of two Germanys—the eastern one dominated by Russia and the western half united at last under the joint control of the United States, Britain, and France, but with a large measure of self-government.

Is our present policy toward this new Western Germany sound?

Edward Litchfield, just returned from Germany and former director of Civil Affairs in Military Government there; and James Pollock, professor of political science at the University of Michigan, former adviser to General Clay, feel that it is not.

Telford Taylor, former brigadier general and chief counsel at the War Crimes trials at Nuremberg; and Charles M. LaFollette, one-time military governor at Wuerttemberg-Baden, Germany, and now National Director of Americans for Democratic Action, feel that we are not following a sound policy toward Western Germany.

We hear from the first affirmative speaker, Mr. Edward Litchfield. Mr. Litchfield. (Applause)

Dr. Litchfield:

Before attempting to defend our present policy toward Germany, many, I would like to explain what Dr. Pollock and I understand that policy to be. In broad outline, we believe it contains three major principles: first, the controlled revival of German economic and political life; second, the incorporation of Germany into an effective economic and political framework for Western Europe; and, third, the democratization of the German people.

I agree with this policy and, with one exception, I agree with the manner in which it has been put into practice. Our policy

ing German economic and political life seems to me sound for three very practical reasons.

In the first place, the Germans are a proud, able, and educated people, who will never develop a convinced democracy if they continue to identify it with the depressed and subject status of an occupied nation.

Conversely, if Germany is permitted a constructive revival, she will occupy her people and permit them to retain their self-respect, the democratic forces within the country will be tremendously strengthened.

In the second place, failure to permit a natural revival would probably foster an introverted nationalism, which, in this period of the cold war, might well become a Soviet ally, and thus endanger the whole program for Western Europe.

Finally, German revival is necessary because her coal mines, steel mills, manufacturing plants, and technical abilities are needed if Western Europe is to have the prosperity required to ward off the economic, political, and, perhaps, military aggressions of the Soviets.

We may not like it, but the fact is that our margin of power in Europe is not so great that we can afford the loss of German co-operation. But the question of German revival cannot be isolated from the remainder of our policy for Germany. It must be considered in conjunction with our plans to integrate Germany into the collective political and economic framework for Western Europe. I think our Government recognizes that a revived Germany is a danger if she stands alone as an independent national unit. However, a Germany whose Ruhr is subject to European controls, a Germany whose resources are allocated by central European authority, a Germany whose standards of democratic practice are subject to European scrutiny — in short, a Germany whose sovereignty has been abridged like that of other European nations — is not such a danger.

The third principle — democratization of the German people — is the most basic in the structure of American policy for Germany. As we've made progress — substantial progress — in establishing many of the outward forms of democratic living, the most important fact in Germany today is that the philosophic framework and the psychological foundations for day-to-day democratic life are still missing. Supplying them will require a general patient, thoughtful, and even inspired effort.

Since our present policy is directed toward such a program of democratization, our practice should give us real concern. I think this program faced serious opposition in the Bureau of

the Budget, and it is constantly threatened by the widespread belief that because we sponsor a controlled German economic and political revival we have necessarily completed our occupation responsibilities.

This is dangerous — perhaps catastrophic — for if this principle is subordinated in planning, or ignored in practice, will have undermined the remainder of our plan and postponed to later years the only basic problem we ever faced in Germany. (Applause)

Moderator Denny:

Thank you, Mr. Litchfield. Well, how do you out there across the length and breadth of America feel about this now? Do you agree with Mr. Litchfield? But, listen, there's another side to that's going to be told first by Telford Taylor, New York attorney who has held various legal positions in our Government, the last of which was general counsel to the FCC. From there he went into the Intelligence Service of the Army. During the first Nuremberg trial, Mr. Taylor was deputy to Supreme Court Justice Robert H. Jackson, and succeeded him as chief counsel for the War Crimes in October, 1946. He resigned from that position in 1948 from the Army with the rank of Brigadier General in August of this year. He is now practicing law here in this city. We welcome Mr. Telford Taylor. (Applause)

Mr. Taylor:

My objections to the manner in which the occupation has been carried out are not based primarily on what we have done, but on what we have failed to do. I have never favored a punitive or vengeful policy toward the German people, or a depressed German economy. I believe that the announced policies to which the occupation was dedicated, as described by Mr. Litchfield, were in general, excellent, but Mr. LaFollette and I both feel that the occupation has suffered from a woeful failure to follow through with some of the most important policies.

There has been a disproportionate emphasis on the economic recovery aspects which has been detrimental to other very important objectives, especially the educational and related programs intended to promote democratization.

Certainly we cannot force feed democracy to the Germans, and I don't criticize military government because Germany is not yet noticeably more democratic than it was when the occupation ended, but I do criticize our failure to make a serious effort in this field.

compared to the time which our top officials spent on economic matters, our investment in the education field was utterly insignificant. Take the problem of textbooks, especially those dealing with recent European history and politics which are, by far, the most important from the standpoint of democratization. As late as the autumn of 1948, no such texts were available in the schools and colleges in the American zone.

The old Nazi texts were banned and no new ones were available. As a result, the last few decades of German history, which should have been a powerful lesson for German youth, have been a mere vacuum.

Admittedly, the re-education program presented real difficulties, but it was never tackled as a major occupational effort. Instead it has been a backwater in which a pitifully small group of sincere people have struggled valiantly to move a boulder with a toothpick. This neglect of our most important occupational objective has, in fact, caused the Germans to conclude that most of our talk about democratization is window-dressing. To this day, we have not convinced the Germans that we mean business. This failure to explain why the Germans have restored so many Nazi supporters to jobs in the civil service, to the teaching profession, to the publishing business, etc.

The reasons for this are important today only if they help us avoid mistakes in the future. Postwar public indifference to education problems has played a part, together with a misplaced concern for economy. There is little point in spending billions of dollars to win a war if one balks at spending the additional millions to win the peace.

Dr. Pollock no doubt will emphasize, the growing tension with Russia has made our occupation task more difficult. But far from dictating the abandonment of our primary purposes of democratization, the East-West split makes that purpose all the more vital, for only a democratic Germany will be a reliable ally. We earnestly hope that preoccupation with the Russian menace will not blind us to the realities of the German situation, and lead us to pursue the illusion that a revived German army, large or small, would promote our security.

The time may come when manpower is the main problem of Western European defense, but that time isn't here yet. The question today is where to find the necessary tanks, and planes, and equipment. I can think of many soldiers who can more safely be trusted with these arms for the defense of democracy than the members of the Wehrmacht. (Applause)

Moderator Denny:

Thank you, Mr. Taylor. Well, Dr. Pollock, that is pretty criticism. As a special adviser to General Clay in Military Government in Germany and consultant to the Secretary of the Army as well as various other official appointments to the Government, what have you to say? Dr. Pollock is professor of political science at the University of Michigan. In 1946, he was awarded the Medal for Merit, the highest civilian recognition given by the United States Government, for his work in Germany during the occupation period. Recently he served as a member of the Hoover Commission on Reorganization. We are very glad to hear at this point from Dr. James K. Pollock. Mr. Pollock. (*Applause*)

Dr. Pollock:

As a result of the recent Paris Conference of the three foreign ministers and the negotiations in Western Germany between the Allied High Commission and the Adenauer Government, the policy of the United States and its allies is to strengthen and encourage the Bonn Government and to work toward its integration into the framework of Western European union.

It is likewise our policy, as Dr. Litchfield has pointed out, to strengthen the security of Western Europe by obtaining the free operation of the West German Government in the International Ruhr Authority and with the work of the Allied Military Security Board.

I believe we now have a clear and sound policy toward Western Germany. This policy is the result of our four years of experience under the occupation. It has resulted in the formation of a viable and satisfactory West German Government, under experienced leadership and on a democratic foundation. It has achieved more positive results and accomplished more for the country and for the peace of the world than one could reasonably have expected at the end of the war.

Out of the German chaos and despite the opposition of the Soviet Union and the existence of almost insuperable difficulties, the United States has moved steadily forward toward the elimination of Germany as a menace to peace and toward her development as a peaceful member of the international community.

The basic fact which has conditioned our German policy has been the failure of the Soviet Union to observe its agreements with respect to Germany. What we might have done if the Soviet Union had cooperated and if we had not had to secure the day-by-day agreement of the French and the British is now before the point. Mr. Taylor seems to overlook this point.

The important fact is that there is now a well-established West German Government, representing two-thirds of the German people standing between Western Europe and the Soviet Union in what might have been a dangerous power vacuum.

At the least we can do in our own interests, as well as in the interests of world peace, is to assist that hopeful German Government in every way consonant with security. West Germany is now strong and can be made an even stronger bulwark against aggressive Soviet Communism. At the same time, her undoubted resources can assist materially in the rehabilitation of the European economy.

At present, we're winning the battle for Germany against communism without currying favor with the Germans, and without sacrificing anything vital in our democratic credo or in sound security planning.

What is practical for Germany in its present poorhouse condition, crowded with thirteen million refugees—and, I might add, numbers are mounting 800 a day with arrivals from the Soviet Zone and Eastern Germany—is entirely different from what would have been feasible and practical if all the Allies, including Russia, had coöperated from the beginning of the occupation in carrying out the provisions of the Potsdam Agreement.

The Adenauer Government should be satisfied and answer enough to those who doubt the accomplishments of our denazification policy. Nazism can hardly be a menace when Konrad Adenauer, a devout Catholic, a bitter foe of communism, and a leader of Western European coöperation, becomes, through the process of a fair and constitutional election, the official head of the West German state.

We've every reason, I believe, to be proud of our record in Germany. The firm and practical administration of General Clay, supported in the last year by the able diplomacy of Secretary Acheson, has brought out of the German chaos a West German Government on the basis of which we can now move forward for or without the Russians toward a settlement of the German problem in a treaty of peace. (*Applause*).

Senator Denny:

Thank you, Dr. Pollock. I was so interested in giving this chance your background over there in Germany that I forgot you are now professor of political science at the University of Michigan.

Now, all of these people are authorities in their field. Our fourth

speaker, Charles M. LaFollette's background is that of a law a former Congressman representing the Eighth District of Indiana, one-time Military Governor of Wuerttemberg-Baden, in Germany, and now National Director of Americans for Democracy in Action, known as A.D.A. Mr. Charles M. LaFollette. (*Applause*)

Mr. LaFollette:

I do not agree with Mr. Litchfield that we have controlled economic and political revival of Germany. I agree with Mr. Pollock that Russia has broken her agreements with respect to Germany, but I do not agree that that action justifies our action in Germany with which I am in disagreement. I agree with Mr. Taylor, that we have made a failure of our effort toward education, and I heartily endorse his belief that there should be no German army at this time.

I do not quarrel with what our Government has said it wants to bring about in Germany—a peace-loving democratic Germany—but I insist that the way we are carrying out that policy is tending more to defeat our aims than to bring them about.

We have on our hands today a Nationalist Germany where 60 per cent of the civil servants and the high economic officials are the same people who supported Hitler. Instead of demanding a positive promise from the new German Government that there will be no more German aggression, we have accepted what they called that government's earnest determination to maintain demilitarization.

What is perhaps worst of all, for this is certainly no way to insure peace, we have allowed the democratic elements in Germany to be discredited almost to the point of destruction.

How did all this come about?

In the first place, we have mistaken the trappings of democracy for democracy, itself. Much too early in the occupation we, the Americans, gave the Germans state constitutions, election laws, and ballots, and then said, "Now, you conduct your own internal affairs, and we will only observe, report, and advise."

We wrongly assumed that people who had lived 13 years under Hitler understood democracy, or knew how it worked. He surrendered in practice our right to remove former Nazis from office or at least to tell them what to do, and having given up that prerogative to veto economic policies that favored the well-to-do at the expense of others, we then said to the Germans, "Correct your own mistakes."

But they couldn't correct their mistakes because we had not let them return to proportional representation, which had always

in a failure in Germany, and we accepted constitutions which allowed elected officials to have a four-year term as a minimum. In the second place, no occupying power has ever more shamefully treated people who tried to support its policies than we have. First, we picked for occupation jobs the liberal Germans who had never been infected with Nazism. But we failed to uproot the undemocratic civil service system, and that made it possible for Nazi judges and government workers to return after they had been acquitted in the shameful denazification process.

The Liberal Democrats we threw out were the only ones who could have carried out our policy. We must strive to execute our policy of supporting democratic forces in Germany. We did not follow a sound policy in Germany when we denied the people of Germany the right to elect representatives to the West German parliament.

The Social Democratic parties in Europe are America's best friends. We must not repeat this error, although it may be too late even now.

In this connection, let me quote a paragraph from the platform of the Americans for Democratic Action, pertaining to Germany. "Support for democratic forces is not a mere phrase. It means support for trade unions. It means full rights to social and economic advancement. It means the encouragement of the free press, and a free exposure to democratic ideas. It requires the exclusion from responsibility of those who have demonstrated their antagonism to democracy by their previous efforts to destroy it."

I commend that statement to the people who are executing our policy in Germany. German democracy will be smothered again unless we insist on giving it the chance to breathe and grow. (Pause)

Operator Denny:

Well, gentlemen, as you've laid this problem out here before me, it seems very complex. I know a lot of us want to ask questions, but we're going to let you ask each other questions up here and we take the questions from the audience. Dr. Litchfield, what about it?

Litchfield: Mr. Denny, it seems to me that we've devoted pretty much too much time to the question of past history—whether we should have had proportional representation in 1946, whether we should have permitted Germans to vote at that time, and a number of other questions that have been raised by the negative, but by a question of whether or not those of us who were there

THE SPEAKERS' COLUMN

JAMES KERR POLLOCK—A native of New Castle, Pa., Dr. Pollock has his A.B. and M.A. degrees from the University of Michigan and his Ph.D. from Harvard. After periods as professor of history and politics at Geneva College, and instructor of political science at Ohio State University, he joined the faculty of the University of Michigan as an instructor in political science. He has been a full professor since 1934, and chairman of the social science division since 1944.

Dr. Pollock has served as a member of the Michigan Committee on Elections, chairman of the Michigan Civil Service Study Committee, and was an election official at the Saar Plebiscite in 1935. He has served on various federal committees and has been a consultant for several government agencies.

In 1947, Dr. Pollock was special adviser to General Lucius Clay, Chief of Military Government for Germany. He is the author of many books and other writings, and has also been a radio commentator.

TELFORD TAYLOR—Mr. Taylor, an attorney, was born in Schenectady, N. Y. He has an A.B. and an M.A. from Williams College and an LL.B. from Harvard. Mr. Taylor has taught history and political science at Williams College, been law clerk to the U. S. Circuit Judge of New York, assistant solicitor with the Department of the Interior, and senior attorney for the Agricultural Adjustment Administration. He was an associate counsel for the U. S. Senate committee on Interstate Commerce, special assistant to the Attorney General of the United States, and gen-

eral counsel for the Federal Communications Commission.

During World War II, Mr. Taylor was a commanding major in the military intelligence service, lieutenant colonel on the general staff corps, colonel of the general staff corps, assigned as military intelligence officer in the European Theater of Operations. He served as a member of the staff, the chief of counsel and representative of the United States for prosecution of the war criminals. In 1946 he was made a brigadier general, Chief of Council for War Crimes at Nuremberg.

EDWARD H. LITCHFIELD—Dr. Litchfield is former Director of Civil Affairs for the American Military Government under General Lucius Clay. He is former Director of the Michigan Civil Service Commission.

CHARLES MARION LAFOLLETTE—LaFollette was born in New Albany, Ind., in 1898. He attended Wabash College and Vanderbilt University, was admitted to the Indiana bar, and engaged in the practice of law at Evansville. Mr. LaFollette was elected to the Indiana General Assembly in 1926, and to the U. S. Congress in 1934. In 1947, he went to Germany as Deputy Chief Counsel for the War Crimes Commission, and also Director of Military Government for Wuertemberg-Baden, Germany.

Mr. LaFollette served with the Army during World War I. He is National Director of the American Democratic Action.

at that time did a sound job. That's a debatable matter, even those of us who were there.

The question this evening is the question of current policy. I think that it's essential that we come back to the major issue, to what current policy is. I, therefore, would like to ask Mr. Taylor as to whether or not he has any basic disagreement with the present policy of economic and political revival in Germany which really began with the establishment of the Bonn Government, and which has been recently illustrated by the tendency to bring Germany back into the community of European nations, an issue we agree to—at least, to study—the question of dismantling.

Mr. Denny: Thank you. Mr. Taylor, he sounds like a lawyer. Doesn't he? Step right up to the witness stand.

Mr. Taylor: I, of course, do not favor economic repression in Germany. I do favor any step to bring Germany into the community of Western democracies. But that entirely leaves open the question as to whether we are putting emphasis on the

ings to bring this about. When Mr. Litchfield tells us that everything is working well except the democratization policy, I think that he has described a very nice airplane. We get in the airplane and it's lined with good intentions, and it even has a pretty outwardness, but you look out the window and you're still on the ground—the darned thing just isn't flying yet. (*Applause*)

Mr. Denny: Thank you. Dr. Pollock?

Dr. Pollock: The answer, Mr. Taylor, seems to be that the Germans have made such remarkable progress in removing some of the conditions which have to be removed if we're going to develop a democratic system that I can't understand why you ask the airplane doesn't take off.

The Germans have made, I think, a rather remarkable economic recovery—with our help, to be sure—but until stomachs are filled and until people have some place to live, and until there is some hope for the morrow, it's rather ridiculous to talk about the successful democratic program.

Mr. Denny: Thank you, Dr. Pollock. Mr. LaFollette, do you want to comment on that, please?

Mr. LaFollette: I think that I would agree with some of the negatives that he stated. I think Dr. Pollock and I will both agree with Mr. Litchfield that we should not have made second-class citizens out of the Germans.

What I object to is that what we have said by our policy of noninterference, which required American Military Government and by which while German officials practiced economic policies which made second-class citizens out of the economically weak Germans, has made it impossible for this airplane to be relied upon because the mass of the German people, upon whom we rely, have been alienated. I should like to ask Dr. Pollock whether he thinks that a policy of noninterference which has gotten this result is a satisfactory policy.

Mr. Denny: Now, Mr. Litchfield wants to comment first, and then we'll hear from Dr. Pollock.

Mr. Litchfield: Mr. Denny, before Mr. Pollock answers that question, I'd like to point out the significance of the admission which has been made both by Mr. LaFollette and Mr. Taylor. Mr. Taylor specifically told you that he accepted the policy of economic and political revival—the first point. He also said he accepted the notion of bringing Germany systematically into an integrated Western Europe.

Now these are two of the most basic points in the present program. I think that in discussing this we shouldn't

overlook the fact that this part of the policy seems to be generally conceded.

The question then turns upon the degree of democratization. I like to submit to you, ladies and gentlemen, that if you have signed a plane and designed it well, and if you've built it and it is in production, but we still have a few bugs to work out—it does not necessarily follow that the plane as a whole should be junked. If we should conclude that the effort—to use the term that's on the evening's program—is not sound.

Mr. Denny: All right. Thank you. I wonder if we should let Mr. Taylor comment further on that plane because he's the man who started this. (*Laughter*) You're the fellow that built this plane. Mr. Taylor.

Mr. Taylor: Yes, but the trouble with this plane is at the moment that you can't take these three things—economic recovery, integration, and democratization—and treat them separately. For example, the question arose recently at the Strassburg Council as to whether Germany should be admitted to the Council of Europe. Well, I happen to think that it should.

The trouble is that this failure in the democratization has proved to be one of the most fatal obstacles to bringing that about because, if you remember rightly, Monsieur Herriot got up and said that the recent trend to nationalism in Germany was a thing that scared him off this business and that until there was a sign of improvement he wouldn't go along with it. We cannot have a failure on the democratization front and achieve the integration objective.

Mr. Denny: Thank you. Dr. Pollock, it's time to hear from you again.

Dr. Pollock: I would like to ask our opponents specifically what they would have done to have avoided some of these things which have been criticized. Mr. LaFollette talks about not uprooting the old service in Germany. If he'd been with me the last two years in Washington, he would have found out that that's a pretty difficult thing to do in *any* country. Because we didn't make a complete success of uprooting all old established existing institutions, it's hardly a fair criticism. The process is not yet completed. Who have we discredited, anyway? He refers to the fact that we have discredited liberals. I thought I had indicated that we went into office, as a result of this whole program, German people free election under the program which we developed, and produced in office a very excellent government which arises out of the German situation and still is not a Nazi government and still is not a militarist government.

Mr. Denny: Thank you, Mr. Pollock. Mr. LaFollette.

Mr. LaFollette: I'd like to answer the second as to who we've discredited. The people that we put in for instance in denazification were Germans who were not nazified. Here is a report by Milton H. Myer, who was the Chief of the Civil Administration Division in Hesse, on October 19, '49. "As further evidence, employees of the denazification ministry may be cited. These employees were guaranteed employment upon the completion of their hapless job. Fifteen hundred have been dismissed; nine hundred still have to be placed in office."

Those were people that we made do a thankless job. And now they can't get a job of any kind in the German Government, and with a certainty that they're having a difficult time getting a job in an economy Germany.

That's the type of reason the airplane doesn't get off the ground. That you haven't got democratic gasoline to put in this plane. (Applause)

Mr. Denny: Thank you. Do you want to speak to the same subject, Dr. Pollock?

Dr. Pollock: I merely wanted to say that by the same token there are a lot of good Republicans in this country that can't seem to be put in good places either. (Applause)

Mr. Denny: Now, Mr. Taylor.

Mr. LaFollette: May I say just something else to that?

Mr. Denny: Yes.

Mr. LaFollette: General Patton got in trouble by saying that he saw no difference between Nazis and non-Nazis and Democrats and Republicans. I'm sure Dr. Pollock doesn't want to get in the same trouble. (Laughter)

Mr. Taylor: I'd like to come back to something that Dr. Pollock said in the course of his talk—that the Adenauer Government itself is a sufficient indication of the success of the denazification program.

Well, it isn't good enough for me. I suppose it's perfectly true that Adenauer and Heuss were not Nazis, but there is certainly a great deal of opposition to the denazification program in the Bonn Government. I would have supposed that if anything was generally agreed upon it is that the inequalities and bad handling of the denazification program have discredited it in Germany, and I'd like to hear Dr. Pollock expand on that.

Mr. Denny: I think, Dr. Pollock, you're asked to explain how we can have a free election and yet get the right people. (Laughter)

Dr. Pollock: I realize the difficulty in getting into discussions of

specific cases. I would be the last person to contend that denazification program, or anybody's denazification program, been or even could have been completely successful.

I do maintain that in the American zone we made a sincere effort to carry out the denazification program, and that in that zone it was more successful than in any other zone in Germany despite all handicaps of Russian noncoöperation, and, sometimes opposition on the part of other powers.

Mr. Denny: All right, thank you, Dr. Pollock. Now there is an eager audience of representative American citizens here in Town Hall tonight. So let us get on with our question period.

QUESTIONS, PLEASE!

Mr. Denny: Now we'll take a question from this gentleman in the second row here.

Man: The charge is made that high Nazis are occupying high positions in the present Bonn Government. Is this so and why is it allowed?

Mr. Denny: You're asking Mr. Taylor that question, are you? All right, Mr. Taylor?

Mr. Taylor: Well, I guess the short answer is that it shouldn't. *(Laughter)*

Mr. Denny: Thank you. The gentleman in the balcony. Yes?

Man: What part does Schacht now play in this new West German Government? Hjalmar Schacht?

Dr. Pollock: He doesn't play any part.

Mr. Denny: That's quick enough. Do you want to talk back?

Man: Yes.

Mr. Denny: That was a question to Dr. Pollock, and he says he doesn't play any part. Do you want to ask him something else?

Man: Dr. Pollock, isn't it a fact that, under American Military Government, he has been officially declared eligible to hold public office?

Dr. Pollock: I don't believe there has been a complete ending of that case against him in Wuerttemberg-Baden. I'm not fully informed about that, but that's my impression.

Mr. Denny: Thank you. Now the gentleman over here on the aisle.

Man: Mr. LaFollette, since we did not destroy the German cartels—the master switch—how can we expect a peaceful democratic Germany in the future?

Mr. LaFollette: I think it's a serious threat to a peaceful democratic Germany. It's one of the reasons, I think, why we've got to exercise external controls over Germany for a lot longer than originally expected to.

Mr. Denny: Thank you. Now the gentleman on the aisle.

Mr. Litchfield: Dr. Litchfield, after four years of military occupation, would you say that the recent resurgence of German nazism, nationalism, and anti-Semitism is all part of the sound policy which you spoke? (Applause)

Mr. Litchfield: I'd like to say in answer to that question that there's no doubt on the part of any serious observer in Germany that there is a serious nationalism, that there are still Nazis, and that there are people who have anti-Semitic views. Nor is there any question but that today Germany is being given an opportunity to more nearly express its opinions, but that those opinions are coming to the fore whereas in the past they were quiet.

I think that the policy question is whether or not you can take a million people in Western Germany and force them, in any reasonable period of time, to believe exactly what you think regardless of what that may be. The question is whether or not you are pursuing the policy that is best in a democratic society to force them to change their opinions.

I think, if we continue our reorientation work and re-emphasize it, we'll have a chance to do it. I don't think you have any chance of driving out nazism by attempting to take the millions of people who were nominal Nazis and attempting to prevent them from exercising any influence in their community. It simply is an impossibility. (Applause)

Mr. Denny: All right, thank you. In the balcony, a question?

Mr. Taylor: Mr. Taylor, will you tell us the present status of Oswald and Otto Ohlendorf, and other major German war criminals sentenced to death in Nuremberg?

Mr. Taylor: The present status of that is as follows: Oswald was sentenced to death approximately two years ago in September, 1947; Ohlendorf was sentenced to death in May of 1948. The execution of those sentences was delayed pending certain proceedings in the American courts which, so far as I know, have now been completed. I know of no further legal reason why the executions should not be carried out, though I am uncertain as to what present intentions are. (Applause)

Mr. Denny: Thank you. The gentleman on the aisle, here.

Mr. Pollock, do you really expect democracy to function

in Western Germany with so many ex-Nazi leaders holding positions in that government? (*Applause*)

Dr. Pollock: I've already indicated that you cannot expect a short period of time, a complete and functioning democracy. I do not believe, and it is not the fact, that high Nazis are holding important places in this West German Government. I said that it was considered it an achievement that a government was set up by the Germans in a full and free election which resulted in a government as good as the present one in power.

Mr. Denny: Thank you. I recognize in the balcony a gentleman who had a good deal to do with the occupation of Germany between World War I and II, a Town Hall lecturer, Colonel Stewart Roddie, of England. Colonel Roddie, could you help us here with a question or a comment?

Colonel Roddie: Well, I think almost everything has been satisfactorily answered by one gentleman, or by them all. There is one little thing which troubles me. The question I would ask of any one single gentleman, but of them all. In dealing with the present, do we take adequate consideration of the past?

Mr. LaFollette, I think, said that we should allow German to breathe and grow, with which I thoroughly approve. We did that after the first World War. We failed to control the breathing and the growing. What I would like to know is, in the future, are we going to control that breathing and growing, or are we going to let it run wild?

It's all very well, dealing with it as we do just now, but the future concerns me very, very deeply. (*Applause*)

Mr. LaFollette: In the first place, I think, in the reference to the past, he got the wrong man. I don't know what I said about breathing and growing. I don't favor, of course, a lenient peace. I said that because I don't believe we have a democratic Germany now, upon which I can rely, that we must have extraordinarily strict external controls. That's my answer. I recognize the past, that's why I give it. (*Applause*)

Mr. Denny: Thank you. *Dr. Pollock?*

Dr. Pollock: I think we have recognized the experience of the past as demonstrated by the setting up of the International Control Authority to control Germany's greatest natural resources, also in the creation of the International Security Board, both of which are there functioning in Germany, at the present time, to continue the controls which the Colonel indicates were desirable.

Mr. Denny: Thank you. Well there you have it from two of them.

Lady: For Telford Taylor. What proportion of former war factories now make civilian goods in Germany?

Mr. Taylor: I regret, Madam, I cannot answer that question in sufficient detail. I'm afraid you'll have to ask one of my associates if he can do better.

Mr. Denny: Can any of you here on the panel tonight answer the question? What proportion of factories that were manufacturing military equipment — armaments — now manufacture civilian goods?

Mr. Pollock: I can say that so far as the American zone is concerned all the plants designated as war plants have been already dismantled.

Mr. LaFollette: Why has a resurgence of nazism been encouraged by those in authority until recently, and who has been responsible for the policy permitting this resurgence?

Mr. LaFollette: My feeling is that we let go of our right to identify and remove incipient Nazis when they began to show their heads much too quickly. I think we relied upon a politically uneducated German people to eliminate Nazis before they had either the ability or the machinery to do it, and that we failed in our obligation by not doing that job ourselves. (Applause)

Mr. Denny: Thank you. Oh, Dr. Litchfield has a comment on

Dr. Litchfield: Mr. Denny, I'd like to reply to that last statement which was made by Mr. LaFollette. There were many different methods in which denazification was attempted in Germany. There were four different zones and there were four different methods. Two areas in which it was done most directly by the occupying powers—that is, the Soviet Zone and the French Zone—are the zones in which you will find the greatest criticism today by the German people, by the democratic elements in Germany, of the way in which denazification was undertaken.

One claims that in the American zone the denazification process was undertaken as completely as we might have liked to have done it. But I think you will find general agreement in Germany today that the best denazification that was undertaken was that which was undertaken by the Americans who let the Germans, themselves, find those in their own communities who were those who deserved the penalties. (Applause)

Mr. Dr. Pollock. Hitler, on order of the military castes—because the only followed their orders—and in order to receive American money, made Germany a bulwark against communism. But he made a certain 1939 pact with Stalin. Why do you imagine that he will not do the same thing now?

Mr. Pollock: There happens to be a great deal of difference between Hitler and Dr. Konrad Adenauer. (Laughter)

Dr. Litchfield: I don't think there's much difference between people who are sitting behind Konrad Adenauer waiting to control and those who brought Hitler to power. (Applause)

Mr. Denny: There are certainly two sides to this question right. The lady in the balcony.

Lady: Mr. Litchfield. Do you think our Government's aid to Germany, which now consists of Marshall Plan Funds and Army appropriations for food, should exceed that given any Western European country?

Mr. Litchfield: I'd prefer to answer that question by saying I think that we're trying to give every European country what they think she requires in order to make her a prosperous and, therefore, a peaceful member of the European community. I don't think we're giving Germany or any of the other countries any more than they require. (Applause)

Man: Dr. Pollock, on what do you base your statement that denazification has been more successful in West Germany than in the other zones; for instance, in the Russian zone?

Dr. Pollock: By a very careful and thorough study not only of the figures, but of the experience in the zone itself and in Germany itself. I do not know anybody who has studied this question thoroughly zone by zone who doesn't come to that conclusion.

Mr. Denny: Thank you. The lady in the center here.

Lady: Mr. LaFollette. Why was our educational program in Germany a failure when we sent teachers who were well trained in the American ways and the American education?

Mr. LaFollette: Well, I think basically it was a failure because very early in the game we had a man who wanted to turn German education completely upside down and put in American progressive education. Of course, that could not have been done, and we should never have tried it. That's one of the basic reasons why it was a failure.

Mr. Denny: Thank you. Mr. Taylor has a comment on that.

Mr. Taylor: I'd like to supplement that the question is not the competence of the few people we sent who labored very hard and well. But I see in the paper this morning that Mr. McCloy has announced a three million dollar program for education. That amount sounds very nice and big, but if you compare it with the total amount that is being spent on the occupation, which is in the neighborhood of 100 times as much, it's quite apparent it's a drop in the bucket. (Applause)

Man: Mr. Litchfield. What is our policy with regard to returning civil property to persecuted Jews and other Germans? I mean property seized by the Nazis and subsequently sold.

Litchfield: Well, I gather from your question that you're familiar with the military government laws which already exist on the subject. Our object is to return, to reconstitute, property as it should be reconstituted. There has never been any doubt about that. As far as I know, we've made every effort to carry it out.

Denny: The man wants to talk further.

an: I would like to know if we are having any success and what is the German reaction to this policy?

Litchfield: Well, there is no question but that there is a severe German reaction to it. You'd expect that. There always has been adverse German reaction. We have had to force it through, and in my opinion, we'll have to continue to force it through.

Denny: Maybe they can get it behind the Iron Curtain, as I understood this summer in Paris that Mr. Andre Maurois' library, which was stolen by Germans in Paris has now turned up in Czechoslovakia. And they are advertising that they have Mr. Maurois' library. (*Laughter*)

Litchfield: Mr. Denny, there is something else I'd like to mention here which I think really deserves correction. There is a general impression, I gather, that the people who man the Adenauer Government today, whether they be in the majority or not, are, if not Nazis themselves, at least puppets whose strings are pulled by Nazis.

I would like to say, ladies and gentlemen, that I worked very closely with the Bonn Constitutional Convention—that was my official responsibility. I know all of these people who today constitute the Adenauer Government. I say to you in all sincerity that I do not know among those men who are playing important roles today a single person who either has been a prominent Nazi or who was closely identified with Nazi interests.

At the same time, I think, realistically, we must admit that there are unquestionably forces in Germany which would like to come to the fore and control these elements. But I say to you that it is a fact that at the present time the Adenauer Government is not being seriously threatened by being dominated by Nazi elements.

We must watch these elements but let's not make the mistake of thinking that they're dominating the government today. (*Applause*)

Denny: Thank you, Mr. Litchfield. Dr. Pollock?

Pollock: I wanted to add one thought with reference to the development of democracy in Germany and an educational program. We must not forget that with the West German Government what we can do now is quite different than what we could

have done earlier. We now must proceed on the basis of mutual trust. That means that the people of this country and the people of Germany must now find means over and above and beyond their respective governments to see that democracy is given a chance. (Applause)

Mr. Denny: Thank you, Mr. Pollock. Mr. LaFollette?

Mr. LaFollette: That's exactly my point: that we should have reserved the right to intercede on behalf of democratic elements in Germany and we let go our control too soon. Now we can't get it back. (Applause)

Mr. Denny: Mr. Litchfield, let's debate this point out right now.

Mr. Litchfield: Mr. Denny, that sounds very good. I wish I could say something that would be as appealing to the audience as Mr. LaFollette's. Ladies and gentlemen, I don't think that's a fact. We still have the occupation statute which reserves completely German sovereignty in the hands of the occupying powers. There is no legal question of it whatever, but that all the powers we ever had are still reserved to us in the event that we feel that there is sufficient threat to the democratic forces in Germany that we care to re-exercise those powers. You have those powers. You've not given them away, and I've never seen any evidence in the four and a half years I spent in Germany of a desire to give them away. (Applause)

Lady: Mr. Taylor, Mr. LaFollette has answered my question in part, but I'd like to ask you the question. What constructive suggestion do you offer for a greater degree of success in carrying out our foreign policy in Germany?

Mr. Taylor: I would answer with four things, primarily. First, a real education program with adequate financing and adequate staff, involving all the things that the experts can work out in this field.

Second, I believe that an effective system for control of the Ruhr should have been worked out before the concessions were made on dismantling and should still be worked out now.

Civil Service reform is the third important point.

Finally, we should make arrangements for a systematic cooperation with the labor groups and bring them increasingly into the sphere of influence. (Applause)

Man: Mr. LaFollette. With the mighty Russian Army in Berlin, don't you think that we'd better get the coöperation of the German peoples in the West, and get it in a hurry?

Mr. LaFollette: Yes, and what I want to get is the mass of German people who make up an army that shoots the guns that we haven't got them now because we've repudiated them. If we do have them, I don't want to give them guns. (Applause)

n: Mr. Taylor, does the atom bomb and modern warfare
Germany obsolete as a battleground or a future military
r?

. Taylor: If your question is does it make German potential
r obsolete, I think definitely not. How this will work out on
battleground business, I can't quite perceive at the drop of
at like this. No, I think the answer is that it does not make
any obsolete as a potential military power.

Denny: Thank you. The lady with the shawl.

ly: Dr. Pollock. Why are the leaders of both zones of Ger-
saving the Nazi officers? Is it in event of a civil war in
any?

Pollock: What zones are you talking about? There happen
four zones.

ly: The Eastern and the Western.

Pollock: Well, of course, we have taken no steps whatever
American Zone or in the three western zones to utilize the
corps which is there. We could have done so, as the Russians
done, but we have avoided it because our policy has not been
to rearm Germany. (Applause)

Denny: Thank you, Dr. Pollock. Now, we shall hear the
aries of tonight's question. First, let us hear from Mr.
dette.

LaFollette: In conclusion, I assert that our actions to date
been a failure because we have helped create a Germany
rich it is dangerous for German Democrats to live and one
has alienated the German workers who would make up a
an army. We cannot count upon such a Germany as a sound
Therefore, we cannot permit it to manufacture armaments,
at this time, maintain an army. (Applause)

Denny: Thank you, Mr. LaFollette. Dr. James K. Pollock.

Pollock: I maintain that our present policy is realistic. It is
on practical experience, and has already had good results.
are winning the postwar battle for Germany against an
sive Soviet Union. The basic split between East and West
world, which my opponents have ignored, necessarily puts
pole German problem in a new perspective. We would be
ol, indeed, in the grim struggle for world peace to throw
German support which has resulted from our occupation.
ause)

Denny: Thank you, Mr. Pollock. Now Mr. Telford Taylor.

Taylor: Mr. Pollock and Mr. Litchfield have both sought
cause the shortcomings of the occupation as necessitated by
behavior of the Russians. In my view, the worst mistake we

can make is to give up for any such reason, or to try and make the Russians in making concessions which will benefit only Germans who are hostile to us and to democracy.

In conclusion, optimism is a very fine quality, but even the most beneficent foods and drugs are bad for you if you take too much of them, and I think Dr. Pollock has given us a very dangerous overdose. (*Applause*)

Mr. Denny: Thank you, Mr. Taylor. Dr. Edward Litchfield.

Dr. Litchfield: I maintain that our German policy is correct because it is based upon all of the sober realities which face us. It recognizes the fact that we must assist democracy in Germany for many years to come. It recognizes the fact that it is impossible to commit 70 million people to second-class citizenship without creating a bitterness which will destroy the struggling for German democracy.

It recognizes the fact that Germany is necessary to a prosperous Western Europe, and, therefore, an absolute essential in a cold war. (*Applause*)

Mr. Denny: Thank you, Mr. Litchfield, Mr. Taylor, Dr. Pollock and Mr. LaFollette. Gentlemen, you've delineated the problem beautifully.

Last week, at the close of our program on the question of recognition to Communist China, we invited our listeners to express their opinions on this subject after having heard both sides discussed. Up till 4.30 o'clock this afternoon, 6,023 letters had been received from all over the United States. Many of these letters contained well-reasoned arguments on both sides, and we congratulate you, our listeners, once again.

The results showed that 1,712 persons, or 28.4 per cent of the whole, favored recognition; while 3,149 persons, or 52.2 per cent, were opposed; 1,162, or 19.4 per cent, expressed no opinion.

Summarizing: Of those voting, 35 per cent said "yes"; 52.2 per cent, "no." These figures will be submitted to our State Department.

Now next week we turn to a domestic problem which is a genuine concern to all of us, whether we are businessmen, laborers, farmers, professional men, or just all-important taxpayers. "Would a \$100-a-Month Pension for All Retired Persons Provide Real Security?"

On the affirmative will be the Honorable Maurice J. Stettin, Secretary of Labor, and Robert Nathan, attorney and economist. On the negative, Congressman Carl T. Curtis, Republican of Nebraska, and M. Albert Linton, president of the Provident Mutual Life Insurance Company of Philadelphia.